

## Measuring Software Security Assurance Initiatives

Brian Chess / March 10, 2010

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Lessons from the cryptographers

- Enemy has unknown capabilities
- Small mistakes can have big consequences

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**Security is hard to measure**

# Standards trump Risk Management

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1. People are bad at risk

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1. People are bad at risk
2. That's not always a bad thing



**Transportation  
Security  
Administration**







Transportation  
Security  
Administration

# Standards

trump

# Risk Management

## Security in the Development Lifecycle




# Initiative > Lifecycle

## Creating a software security initiative



- Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)
- Cookbook for security initiatives
- Community-oriented (OWASP)
- <http://www.opensamm.org>

- Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM)
- Real data from real initiatives
- McGraw, Chess, & Miguels
- <http://bsi-mm.com>



**One framework** for describing all software security assurance initiatives.

# Data are good



## The data say

- 67% of surveyed companies use static analysis  
– 88% in USA



### The data say

- 60% of surveyed companies do fuzz testing
  - 100% in USA



### The data say

- Software security assurance team is %1 the size of the development team
  - Same in US and Europe



## The data say

- Training hollow



## The data say

- Banks do compliance better than ISVs



## The data say

- Little flow between verification tools



## The data say

- Resources split between governance, construction, verification, and response



## Approaches to software security assurance

### Builders



*"You must build  
security in"*

## Approaches to software security assurance

### Fatalists



*"Software is  
always  
vulnerable."*



## Approaches to software security assurance

Builders



*"You must build security in"*

Fatalists



*"Software is always vulnerable."*

## Approaches to software security assurance

Builders



*"You must build security in"*

**Room  
for  
Innovation**

Making software  
easier to build  
and defend

Fatalists



*"Software is always vulnerable."*

## Conclusion

- Invest in standards
- Measure process
- Blend construction and reaction